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Abstract: This paper provides new evidence on the simple and interaction effects 
of School-Based Management and Standards-Based Accountability on student 
achievement. The data used in the analysis comes from PISA (Programme for 
International Student Assessment) 2006 survey that assesses the performance in 
reading, mathematics and science of around 400,000 15 year-old students from 
57 countries. We build a Structural Equation Model to investigate the 
relationship between student achievement and the other latent variables. Our 
findings indicate that the joint adoption of School-Based Management and 
Standards-Based Accountability has a significant positive effect on student 
achievement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
School-Based Management (SBM) and Standards-Based Accountability (SBA) have been 
central issues in the international education policy debate over the last decade [2]. 
SBA identifies school accountability systems based on academic standards, which are largely 
widespread around the world [5]. These systems tend to focus on centralized tests to assess 
student achievement, usually by setting standards at a state or federal level, as the well-known 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act in the United States.  
SBM is defined as the decentralization of authority from the central government to the school 
level [3], which identifies the individual school as the primary unit of improvement and transfers 
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responsibility and decision-making over school operations to principals, teachers, parents, 
sometimes students, and other school community members [1]. Currently SBM is one of the key 
themes of Economics of Education addressed by the World Bank, thus becoming more and more 
implemented in both developed and developing countries. 
The research literature in this interdisciplinary fields can benefit from various traditions of 
studies (e.g., school accountability, school effectiveness, school improvement, school indicators), 
which need to be better integrated. In many cases different authors use diverse terms to indicate 
similar concepts, so highlighting that SBM and SBA can be observed by multiple perspectives 
and take many different forms within the international education community.  
The empirical evidence on the effect of SBM and SBA on student performance has shown some 
important results that should always represent the foundation of education policy reforms 
worldwide, but the debate is still hot and needs further investigation.  
That having been said, our work intends to contribute to the framework of a recent series of 
cross-national studies based on PISA and TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study). 
In particular, a recent paper, which makes use of a panel dataset constructed from the four waves 
of international PISA tests spanning 2000-2009, reveals that the decentralization of decision-
making and school autonomy affect student achievement negatively in developing and low-
performing countries, but positively in developed and high-performing countries [7]. Some other 
researches find that education systems in which schools have more autonomy experience 
improved test performance in the cases in which there are mandated external school exit 
examinations [6, 9, 10, 11]. 
This evidence seems to prove that the joint adoption of central examinations and school 
autonomy represents a precondition for the good functioning of decentralized education systems, 
by reducing the opportunistic behavior of local decision-makers. 
Our paper provides new evidence on the simple and interaction effects of SBM and SBA on the 
student achievement assessed by an international cross-sectional survey. To be precise, the data 
used in the analysis comes from PISA 2006 survey, the third cycle of PISA, which measures the 
performance in reading, mathematics and science of around 400,000 15 year-old students from 
57 countries.  
We build a Structural Equation Model to investigate the relationship between student 
achievement and the other latent variables. 
 
 
2. Empirical Models 
 
In our analysis, student achievement, SBM and SBA are unobservable variables called Latent 
Variables (LV), each measured by a set of observed indicators usually defined as Manifest 
Variables (MV), so the most proper statistic methodology is Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM). Student achievement is measured by student performance in reading, mathematics and 
science. The MVs related to the other LVs consist of some selected questions of the “School 
Questionnaire”, answered by the principals. 
In order to show the simple and interaction effects of SBM and SBA on student achievement, we 
build two models by software SmartPLS 2.0 [8]: the first without interaction term and the second 
with interaction effect. 
The model without interaction term consists of three LVs: student achievement, SBM, and SBA, 
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measured by the MVs described in Table 1. We assume that the LV student achievement 
depends on the other two LVs. We apply the Partial Least Squares estimation method [12]. 
The model with interaction term consists of four LVs: student achievement, SBM, SBA, and the 
interaction effect (SBM*SBA). Using the standardized or centered indicators of two predictor 
variables, product indicators are then developed by creating all possible products from the two 
sets of indicators. These product indicators are used to reflect the latent interaction variable. We 
assume that the LV student achievement depends on all the other LVs. For its properties, we 
apply the Partial Least Squares Product Indicator approach [4]. As suggested by [4], we assume 
that each MV reflects its LV. 
 
Table 1. Latent Variables and Manifest Variables. 
Latent Variables Manifest Variables 
Student 
achievement 
(achiev) 
(reading)  Student achievement in reading  
(math)      Student achievement in mathematics 
(science)  Student achievement in science 
School-Based 
Management 
(SBM) 
Q12 (SC12Q). Regarding your school, which of the following bodies: A) 
The school’s “governing board”; B) Parent groups; C) Teacher groups; D) 
Student groups exert a direct influence on decision making about: 1) 
Staffing; 2) Budgeting; 3) Instructional content; 4) Assessment practices? 
(SC15Q1) Does your school provide information to parents of students in 
“national modal grade for 15 year-olds” on their child’s academic 
performance relative to other students in “national modal grade for 15 year-
olds” in your school? 
(SC15Q2) Does your school provide information to parents of students in 
“national modal grade for 15 year-olds” on their child’s academic 
performance relative to national or regional “benchmarks”? 
(SC15Q3) Does your school provide information to parents on the academic 
performance of students in “national modal grade for 15 year-olds” as a 
group relative to students in the same grade in other schools? 
Standards-Based 
Accountability 
(SBA) 
D16 (SC16Q1) Which statement below best characterises parental 
expectations towards your school? 
A) There is constant pressure from many parents, who expect our school to 
set very high academic standards and to have our students achieve them 
B) Pressure on the school to achieve higher academic standards among 
students comes from a minority of parents 
C) Pressure from parents on the school to achieve higher academic 
standards among students is largely absent 
(SC17Q1) Achievement data are posted publicly? 
(SC17Q2) Achievement data are used in evaluation of the principal’s 
performance? 
(SC17Q3) Achievement data are used in evaluation of teachers’ 
performance? 
(SC17Q4) Achievement data are used in decisions about instructional 
resource allocation to the school? 
(SC17Q5) Achievement data are tracked over time by an administrative 
authority? 
Interaction effect 
(SBM*SBA) 
All possible products from the two sets of indicators 
!  
3. Results  
 
Figure 1 shows the model without interaction term, the proportion of the variance explained by 
the model, 2R , and the path coefficients, which are both positive. This means that both SBM and 
SBA positively affect student achievement, but, as the coefficients are standardised, the effect of 
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SBA, with a path coefficient equal to 0.329, is more important than the effect of SBM on  
student achievement. However, the model goodness-of-fit measured by 167.02 =R is low, so the 
model needs some improvements. 
 
 
Figure 1. Model without interaction term. 
 
In order to improve the model, we introduce the interaction effect between SBM and SBA and 
we carry out the model with interaction term. 
First of all, as we suppose that each MV reflects its LV, it is necessary to check the 
unidimensionality of the blocks by means of Cronbach’s alpha. Table 2 shows that all the values, 
except one that is equal to 0.69, are larger than 0.7, so the blocks can be considered 
unidimensional. 
 
Table 2. Cronbach’s alpha. 
 SBM SBA Interaction term Student achievement 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.69 0.83 0.93 0.85 
 
Figure 2 shows the model with interaction term, the proportion of the variance explained by the 
model, 2intR , the path coefficients, their bootstrap mean (in round brackets) and their p-values (in 
square brackets) calculated by bootstrap resampling. The model goodness-of-fit measured by 
510.02int =R  is considerably improved.  
Therefore, we observe the interaction effect size, computed as ( ) 2int22int2 RRRf −= , 
remembering that an effect size of 0.02 is regarded as weak, an effect size between 0.15 and 0.35 
as moderated, and an effect size higher than 0.35 as strong. Since the effect size, 67.02 =f , is 
very strong, the model with interaction term is highly preferable.  
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Looking at the path coefficients, we can see that all the coefficients are positive, so the SBM, the 
SBA, and their interaction effect have a positive influence on student achievement. In particular, 
as the coefficients are standardised, we can state that the interaction effect is	  the most important 
driver for student achievement, with a path coefficient equal to 0.571, while the simple influence 
of SBA (path coefficient: 0.112) and SBM (path coefficient: 0.042) is considerably weaker. 
For assessing the significance of parameter estimates, resampling procedures are used. The 
bootstrap procedure ensures that the path coefficients are stable. In fact, the bootstrap means of 
path coefficients are close to the estimations obtained on basic sample; the Standard Error of the 
bootstrap estimates for the path coefficients is low. 
Considering that the path coefficient of the interaction term is significantly higher than the others 
and the path coefficient of SBM is low and has a p-value equal to 0.11, we can state that only the 
joint adoption of SBM and SBA can lead to a relevant improvement of student achievement. 
  
 
Figure 2. Model with interaction term. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our analysis, based on the dataset of PISA 2006 survey, leads to the following result: the 
separate adoption of SBM and SBA seems to have a positive effect on student achievement, 
especially in the case of SBA, but their joint application has a much stronger impact. 
Though the model with interaction term is fairly good (usually 2R are not high for SEM), further 
research could be developed based on the datasets of PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. The 
identification of others LVs that can affect student performance and the introduction in the block 
of SBA of an additional MV related to central examinations, could help to improve the model.  
Furthermore, considering in our research the distinction between developing and developed 
countries could lead to new findings. Lastly, this paper adopts a reflective scheme as suggested 
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by [4], but it could be interesting to use a formative scheme by a two-step construct score 
procedure [4]. The implementation of a formative scheme, where each LV is generated by its 
own MVs, could improve the model goodness-of-fit. 
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